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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
ALICE LOOS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN ~DEL SUPPLiY 
OOMP ANY, a corporation, and 
UTAH MOTOR PARK, IN-
CORBORATIDD, a corporation, 
Defen&ants and Appellants. 
No. 6211 
Brief of Appellant Utah Motor Park, Inc. 
S.TATEMENT OF THE OA:SE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff to recover 
damages for personal injurie·s ·claimed to have been re-
ceived by plaintiff as the result of a gas explosion upon 
the premises of defendant Utah Motor Park, hereinafter 
referred to as the Motor Park. The defendant Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as the 
Gas Company, is joined as a:n alleged joint tort-feasor as 
the supplier of the gas which caused the explosion. 
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During winter months the cottages of the Motor 
Park .are rented out to tenants for housekeeping purposes 
by the week and month. Plaintiff and her husband were 
tenants of caibin 403 upon a weekly basis, having just paid 
rental for the second week when the explosion o:ccurred. 
Their cabin consisted of a kitchen, ·Combined living and 
bedroom .and a bathroom. Within the cottage, in addi-
tion to a bed, chairs, table and kitchen equipment, there 
was a gas range in the kitchen and a gas heater in the 
living room. The range had to be lighted with a match 
and the gas heater was what is known as a floor heater 
with .a pilot light, and there was a handle on the furnace 
to regulate the gas. All appliances within the cottage 
were operated by the tenant. 
A number of ·other cottages at the Motor Park sim-
ilarly equipped were rented to permanent tenants by the 
week or mont!h. In each instan:ce all appliances and facili-
tie-s were under the exclusive ;control of the tenants. 
The cabins were constructed in pairs, with a garage 
separating each pair of cottages from other cottages in 
the same group. (,See Exhibit I f.o.r illustration). T'he 
Loos cabin .faced west and was known as cottage 403. The 
adjoining cottage on the east was known as No. 303 and 
was ·occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler. Only a partition 
separated the Loos cottage from the W1heeler cottage. 
Immediately south of the Wheeler cottage and separated 
from it by a garage was cottage 304, ·OC1cupied ·by Mr. and 
Mrs. Bussell. 
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Gas for use in the Motor Park was supplied by the 
defendant Gas Company. 'T'he Motor Park re-ceived this 
supply through two separate iTistallations of mains and 
pipes: One for heating purposes and a different one for 
cooking purposes. George Lindholm, manager of the 
Motor Park, testified that there was a meter at the en-
trance to the Motor Park for the domestic supply which 
was used for cooking, and another meter for the indus-
trial supply used for heating, which was located in the 
office 'building. Ga·s was used in approximately 112 out 
of the 125 ·cabins. All of the cottages in the immediate 
vicinity of the Lo·os cottage were equipped with appli-
ances for both heating and cookiTig. 
In the operation of these gas facilities by tenants of 
the Motor Park there were occasions when leaks would 
develop in the appliances, and a.s a result there were oc-
casions when odors o.f gas would be reported to the of-
fice ·of the :M-otor Park. All employees of the Motor Park 
had instructions that if there were any gas leaks or re-
ports -of gas odors that the Ga.Js Company should be called 
immediately. The Oas ·Company then .sent a service man 
to take care of it. Excepting for ma.j·or repairs where 
broken pipes had to be replaced or where there was de-
fective equipment all repairs were made by the Gas Com-
pany. This practice wa.s followed in each and every in-
stance where a ·leak was reported or a gas odor detected. 
In renting cottages employees of the Motor Park 
would make an inspection and instruct the tenant with 
reference to operation of the appliances. The Motor 
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Park had nothing to do with operation ·of the facilities 
or appliances within the cottages. ·Thos·e appliances and 
facilities were operated by the tenants themselves. The 
only time the employees of the Motor Park operated the 
appliances wa.s when the ·cottages were first occupied, at 
which time they would light the pilot light, if it was not 
already lighted, and instruct the tenants with reference 
to the manner of operation. ·The M·otor Park had nothing 
to .do with the regulation of the .supply of gas to the 
Park 'This was under the exelusive control of the de-
fendant Gas Oompany. 
·Each 1cotta.ge had a vent in the foundation leading to 
the area beneath the floor. There was also a .four inch 
gas vent from ~the gas furnace out through the roof. 
An explosion occurred in the Loos cottage on Jan-
nary 22, 1938, a.s a. result of which plaintiff was injured. 
The cause of the explosion i·s unknown. No evidence was 
given by any witness upon that subject matter. 
Details as to speci:fie evidence as applied to the part-
icular allegations in the pleadings will be discussed and 
considered in connection wit:h the respe1ctive assignments 
·of error. 
Gomes now the defendant and appellant Utah Motor 
Park, Incorporated, a corporation of the .State of Utah, 
a:nd respectfully says that there is manifest error in the 
record, proce·edings and judgment of the trial court in 
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the above entitled cause, and respectfully assigns errors 
as follows, to-wit: 
I. 
The trial court erred in denying the motion of .said 
defendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, for a judg-
ment of non""'suit; that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain .or justify the decision and order of said Court 
in this, that the plaintiff failed to establish any ne.gli-
gence of said defendant as alleged in the eomplaint whLch 
proximately caused or contributed to the accident or in-
jury in said cause; that plaintiff failed to prove tha.t any 
pipes or ·CO'Ilnections within or about the premises of said 
defendant became cracked or broken or developed leaks 
and permitted gas to escape into or under the floor of 
the apartment occupied by plaintiff, and wholly failed to 
prove or establish by any ·evidence whatsoever that any 
gas from a ·cracked, broken, or leaky pipe, ·Or connection 
escaped into or under the floor of said apartment, and 
wholly failed to prove or establish by any evidence that 
any gas from any cracked, br·oken, leaky or defective 
pipe or connection caused the explosion in question in 
said cause; that plaintiff wholly failed to establish or 
prove by .any evidence whatsoever that after the con-
struction of said building defendant carelessly, negligent-
ly, or otherwise excavated a pit for the installation, and 
installed, a furnace at or near the eenter of said building 
and •so near the foundation and support of said building 
under the partition separating said apartment as to per-
mit the same to settle and the weight thereof to rest 
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upon the pipes furnishing gas to the furnatee and pro-
jecting. through the partition between the apartments; 
that plaintiff wholly failed to establish or prorve that said 
defendant carelessly and negligently failed and neglected 
to provide proper and sufficient ventilation for the area 
under said apartments, and carelessly and negligently 
closed or permitted the small-opening provided as venti-
lators to be closed and obstructed; that on the contrary 
plaintiff's own ev~dence established the contrary thereof; 
that plaintiff wholly failed to establish by any competent 
evidence that defendant failed .and omitted to make fre-
quent inspection of said pipes, ·Connections, O·r premises; 
plaintiff failed to establish by any evidence that defend-
ant continued to furnish gas under pressure to the apart-
m·ent ·Occupied by plaintiff after it knew or should have 
known that any pipes were broken, defective, and leak-
ing gas, and that the ventilators thereof were clos·ed and 
obstructed, but on the contrary plaintiff's evidenc-e af-
firmatively showed that any gas so furnished to plaintiff 
was furnished by defendant Mountain Fuel iSupply Com-
pany, a ·corporation; and wholly failed to establish or 
prove ·by .any competent evidence that any pipes were 
broken, defective and leaked, .and wholly .failed to estab-
lish by any evidence that the ventilators thereof were 
closed and obstructed; that plaintiff further failed to es-
tablish by any ·competent evidence that any act, deed, or 
omission ·of .said defendant proximately caused or 00ntri-
buted to any accident ·Or injury to plaintiff; that plaintiff 
failed to establish or prove iby any competent evidence 
that there was any defect whatsoever in the premises oc-
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cupied by plaintiff, and wholly failed to prove 'O'r estab-
lish by any evidence that defendant knew or should have 
known of the existence of any .such alleged defect or de-
fective condition. ('Tr. 268, 269, Ab. p. 54, 55.) 
II. 
That the Court erred in giving instruction Number 
2. That the evidence to sustain or justify the giving of 
such instruction was insufficient; that there w:as no evi-
dence whatsoever to the effect that this defendant was 
supplying gas to the premises o0cupied by plaintiff; that 
on the contrary the uncontradicted evidence ~showed and 
established that said defendant was the landlord and that 
plaintiff was a tenant of said premise.s. ( Tr. 315, 3'23, 324, 
Ab. p. 89, 97, 98.) 
III. 
That the Court erred in the g1.v1ng of instruction 
number 4. That the evidence to justify or sustain the 
giving of such instruction was insufficient; that said in-
struction implies and infers that plaintiff had presented 
.some evidence to the effect that the system of pipes with-
in the premrses of defendant Utah M.otor Park was de-
fective, leaking, and that gas was escaping therefrom, 
and that gas coming from defective or leaking pipes 
caused the explosion a~nd injury to plaintiff; that there 
was no evidence in said cause that any pipes whatsoever 
were leaking or defe1etive, and that there was no evidence 
whatsoever that gas from any such 'Source caused the ex-
plosion or injury; that if there was any evidence what-
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soever, which defendant denies, of the fact that any pipes 
were defective or leaking, that said instruction assumed 
and imputed the existence of such facts instead of per-
mitHng the jury to~ find with reference thereto. (Tr. 316, 
324, A b. p. 89, 90, 98.) 
IV. 
The Court erred 'in giving instruction number 10. 
That the evidence to justify or sustain the giving of such 
instruction was insufficient; that the Court assumed that 
it was established by the evidence that there was no con-
flict with reference thereto that gas was escaping in or 
under -cabins 303 or 403 prior to the time of the explosion; 
that in making .such assumption the ·Court took said ques-
tion .from the jury instead of leaving it for the jury to 
determine, whether gas was escaping in or under the 
said ·Caiblins prior to the ·explosion. (Tr. 319, 324, Ab. p. 
93, 98.) 
v. 
The Court erred in giving instruction number 11. 
That the evidence to justify and sustain the giving of 
such instruction is insufficient; said instruction assumes 
that there were leaks and defects in the servi·ce pipes of 
defendant Utah Motor Park; that there was no evidence 
with reference thereto, or if there was any evidence with 
reference thereto it was for the jury to find as a fact. tTr. 
319, 3·24, A b. p. 93, 98.) 
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VI. 
The Court erred in the giving ·of instruction number 
12. That the evide·nce to justify and sustain the giving 
of such instruction was insufficient; said instruction im-
plies, infers, and states that there was a defect in the gas 
pipes 'Or appliances under or in cabins 303 or 403 of de-
fendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, and implies, in-
fers, and states that gas e.s·c.aped therefrom which result-
ed in the explosion and injury to plaintiff; that there was 
no evidence ·of •any defect in the gas linHs or appliances; 
that there wa1s no evidence that tlhe gas which caused the 
explosion .and injury to plaintiff was from any such al-
leged defect in the gas lines or appliances; that if there 
was any such evidence that it was an i·ssue of fact to be 
found by the jury, and that the Court erred in instructing 
the jury that such defect existed and that gas from such 
source caused the explosion and resulted in the injury 
to plaintiff. (Tr. 319, 320, 324, 325, Ab. p. 93, 94, 98, 99.) 
VII. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction number 1. ( Tr. 40, 325, A b. p. 77, 
99.) 
VIII. 
The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's re-
quested instruction number 2. That the evidence to justi-
fy and sustain the refusal of the Court to give said in-
struction is insufficient; that the ullJeontradicted and af-
firmative .evidence in said eause was to the effect that all 
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appliances, pipes and connections within ~said premises 
were under the exclusive contr~ol of plaintiff and other 
tenants in said premises, and that the gas used in said 
premises was being supplied by defendant Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company. (Tr. 41, 325, A:b. p. 77, 99.) 
IX. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give requested 
instrlfction numher 2-A. (Tr. 411/2, 325, Ab. p. 77, 78, 99.) 
X. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction number 4. ( Tr. 44, 325, A b. p. 78, 
79, 99.) 
XI. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
r·equested instruction number 7. ('Tr. 48, 32:5, Ab. p. 79, 
80, 99.) 
XII. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction number 8. ('Tr. 49, 325, Ab. p. 80, 
99.) 
XIII. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction number 9. ( Tr. 50, 3'2.5, Ab. p. 80, 
81, 99.) 
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XIV. 
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction nun1her 10. (Tr. 51, 325, Ab. p. 81, 
82, 99.) 
XV. 
That the Court erred in denying the motion of said 
defendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, for a new 
trial. That the evidence tn justify and sustain the de-
cision of the Court in denying said motion is insufficient 
in the particulars set forth herein with reference to 
denial of the motion for non-suit, to whieh reference is 
hereby made and by .such reference made a part here·o:f. 
('Tr. 91, 92, 101, Ab. p. 102, 103, 104.) 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR DE·TIDRMINATION. 
POINT I. 
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO T AK.E THE CASE 
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
POINT II. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO 
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
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POINT III. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REPE'ATE'DLY ASSUMING AND STAT-
ING TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE 
SYSTEM OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DE-
~,ECTIVE, LEAKLNG, AND THAT GAS WAS ESCAPING 
THJ£REFROM, AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSED THE 
EXPLOSION AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DE-
~,ECTIVJ!J OR LEAKING PIPES? 
POINT IV. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE 
SAME DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS THE GAS COM-
pANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAS? 
POLNT V. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE MOTOR PARK AS LANDLORD IS NOT LIABLE 
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF LATENT OR HIDDEN DEFECTS 
OR UNKNOWN OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS UPON THE 
PREMISES, AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF WARRANTY 
THE PLAINTIFF TOOK THE PROPERTY AND RENTED THE 
CABIN SUBJECT TO ALL HIDDEN OR LATENT DEFECTS 
OF WHICH THE MOTOR PARK HAD NO KNOWLEDGE, AND 
THAT IF THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED BY THE UNEXPECT-
ED BREAKING OR GIVING WAY OF SOME JOINT, PIPE, 
OR CONNECTION NO LIABILITY WOULD EXIST ON THE 
PART OF THE MOTOR PARK? 
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POINT VI. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO TAKE FROM THE JURY 
CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THE MOTOR PARK WITH 
REFERENCE TO WHICH THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE? 
POINT I. 
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE 
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
(Assignments of Error I and VII). 
At the ·conclusion of plaintiff's case defendant made 
a motion for judgment of non.Jsuit which was denied. At 
the end of the trial defendant requested the trial court 
to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of defend-
ant, no ·cause of .action. This request was denied. De-
fendant contends that both of these rulings were errone-
ous. 
·There IS no dispute between the parties as to the 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant. In para-
graph 4 of the complaint plaint·iff alleges that she was a 
ten:ant of defendant. The oourt in instruction No. VI 
instructed the jury that it is undisputed that the relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant Utah Motor Park, 
Inc., was that of landlord and tenant, and they were in 
structed that such was the relationship. 
The acts of neg~igence upon w.hich plaintiff relied 
are .set forth in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the compl·aint. 
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Briefly ·stated they are as follows: That the cottage was 
heated by means of a gas furnace installed in a pit or 
excav-ation under the floor near the center of the build-
ing and the partition dividing the apartment from the 
one a.t the east end of the building ; that the furnace was 
equipped with a pilot light kept constantly burning, and 
that in installing the furnace the pipes and connections 
for the same were projected through the partition be-
·tween the east and west apartments. It is alleged that 
the defendants knew or should have known that the pipes 
and connections would become cracked and broken or 
otherwise develop leaks .and permit gas to escape into 
the apartment or into the are·a under the floor there-
of, and that it was the duty of defendants to avoid pla~ 
1ng or permitting weight or stress upon the pipes, or 
to so place them that they might be cracked or broken, 
and to avoid making alterations or repairs in such man-
ner as to cause the building to settle upon or put stress 
upon the pipes and cause breaks or leaiks therein. It 
is also alleged that it was the duty of defendants to 
make frequent and careful inspection of the pipes for 
the s·afety and protection ·of the tenants, and that it was 
likewise their duty to provide proper and sufficient 
ventilation of the area under ~he floor so that any gas 
which might leak could esc:ape freely. It is then alleged 
that after construction of t~he building defendant did the 
foUowing: (a) Excavated a pit for the furnace at or 
near the center ·of the building and so near the founda-
tion as to permit the building to settle and the weight to 
rest upon the pipe·s furnishing gas to the furnace, which 
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pipes projected through the partition between the cot-
tages; and (b) failed and neglected to provide proper and 
sufficient ventilation for the area under the apartment; 
and (e) closed or permitted the small openings provided 
as v.entila tors to be closed and obstructed; and (d) failed 
and omitted to make frequent or any inspection of the 
pipes; and (e) continued to furnace gas under pressure 
after they knew or should have known that the pipes were 
broken, defective and leaking gas. 
Let us now first se·e what, if any, ev,idence there was 
to sustain any of those allegations of negligence each 
and all of \Yhich were put in issue by the answer of de-
fendant Motor Park. 
Not a witness of any kind testified to the effect that 
the pit for the furnace was anywhere near the center of 
the building. In fact no one testified upon the .subject 
matter at all and we call upon plaintiff to produce a 
reference in the record to any such evidence. Nor did 
anyone testify to the effect that the building settled or 
that the pipes proj-ecting through the partition became 
cracked or broken; nor did anyone testify to the effect 
that the gas which caused the explosion came from a 
leak in any pipes. In fact no one testified at all upon 
the subject as to· where the gas eame from which caused 
the explosion, namely: whether it came from an open 
gas jet from one of the appliances operated by the ten-
ants themselves; whether it came from a leak in the 
pipes ; whether it was sewer gas from some source out-
side of or beyond the cottage ; or whether it was natural 
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gas finding its way into the -are.a heneath the cottage from 
leaks in the gas main at ~some point wholly unknown to 
anyone. There was absolutely no evidence given by any 
wi'tness upon this subject matter. Certain it is that if, 
as testified to by Mrs. Loos and her husband,· this ex-
plosion occurred beneath the floor of the ·cottage, then 
certainly there wa,s no leak in the pipes projecting 
through the partition at a point above the floor hecause 
gas rises and would not find its way from a point above 
the floor down into the area beneath the floor. 
As to ventilation beneath the cottage the evidence 
is uncontradicted as given by Mr. Loos (.A:b. 29) and Mr. 
Lindholm, manager of the Motor Park (Ab. 65), to the 
effHct that there was a vent 4 in. x 8 in. in ,size in the 
foundation to each ·of these cottages. No one testified 
that these vents were in any way insufficient, nor did 
anyone testify that they were -closed, and on the contrary 
plaintiff's own witness, namely. her husband, testified 
that they were open. 
As to inspection of the premises the uncontradicted 
evidence (Ab. 28) was to the effect that a representative 
of the company went with plaintiff and her husband to 
the cottage at the time when it was rented, and there was 
nothing which occurred subsequent thereto which called 
for any additional inspection or any inspection in addi-
tion to that which was given. We s'hall discuss the suf-
ficiency of this particular allegation of negligence here-
after. 
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This ealls for consideration of only one other ad-
ditional alleged ground of negligence, namely, continuing 
to furnish gas under pressure after it knew or should 
have known that the pipes were broken, defective and 
leaking gas. As to this particular allegation of negli-
gence we respectfully .submit that it has nothing wha tso-
ever to do with the defendant Motor Park since nowhere 
is there an allegation to the effect that the Motor Park 
was furnishing any gas, but on the contrary the amended 
complaint, paragraph 2, alleges that the defendant gas 
company was engaged in the business of supplying the 
gas in question, and in paragraph 3 of the complaint it 
is again expressly alleged that the apartment in question 
was ·supplied with gas from the system of pipes of the 
defendant gas company. The only witness who testified 
upon the subject was George Lindholm, manager of de-
fendant, who testified (Ab. G6) that "the Utah Motor 
Park had nothing to do with the regulation .o.f the supply 
of gas to the park''. 
The extent and character of responsibility which the 
landlord ·owes toward a tenant so far as liability for dam-
ages is concerned is so well established in this State that 
it is not necessary to go beyond our own decisions for 
the law. 
In the case of Hatzis v. United Stales Fuel Company 
decided in 1933, 82 Utah 38, 21 Pa:c. (2d) 86'2, it was 
stated as follows : 
'·'The gist ,of the negligence charged in the 
complaint is that defendant, as the landlord well 
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knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and 
diligence should have known, of the presence of 
•the caps in the cupboard, where found by plain-
tiff, and negligently failed to remove them or to 
warn plaintiff or his family of their presence. We 
find no evidence in t:his record directly proving 
or tending to prove that the defendant either 
·stored the caps in the place where found or knew 
tha:t they were there, or that any ·Of its agents, 
servants, or employees placed them in the cup-
board or knew or their presence therein. There is 
therefore no liability on defendant as landlord 
unless the law imposes the duty on it to inspect the 
·pre-mises to discover the hidden explosives and 
to remove them or to warn plaintiff and his family 
of their presence. We are sa tisfi.ed the la.w im-
poses no such duty on the landlord. The rule ap-
plicable is well stated in 16 R. C. L. 775, as fol-
lows: 
'In the absence of warranty, deceit, 
or fraud on the part of a landlord, the rule 
of caveat emptor applies to leases of real 
estate, the control of which passes to the 
tenant, and it is the duty of the tenant to 
make examination of the demised premises 
to determine their safety and adaptability 
to the purpo·ses for which they are hired. 
Hence, for personal injuries received by 
him from latent defects therein, of whieh 
the landlord :had no knowledge at the time 
of the lease the latter cannot be held re-
sponsible.' 
And at page 777 : 
'According to the weight of authority 
an owner of property, unaffected by a pub-
lic use, does not owe to his prospective 
lessee the duty of actively exerting ordi-
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nary care at the time of leasing to discover 
and apprise him ·of unknown defects which 
the lessee could equally well find out for 
himself.' 
To similar effect are other authorities: 36 C. 
J. -!3; 2 Underhill, Landlord & Tenant, 784; 1 
Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, 556; 18 A. & E. Enc. 
of Law ( 2d Ed.) 225; 1 Thompson on Negligence, 
sec. 1130. '' 
·This case but reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in 
Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368, which was 
an action involving injuries to a tenant arising out of 
structural defects in the wall of a bUilding. This court 
denied liability and esta·blished the following proposi-
tion of law: 
'''The general proposition is well settled that 
in the absence of warranty, deceit, or fraud on the 
part of the landlord, the lessee takes the risk of 
the quality of the premises, and cannot make the 
landlord answerable for any injuries sustained by 
·him during his occupancy by reason ·of the de-
fective condition of the premises or their faulty 
construction. Doyle v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 147 
U. S. 413, 13 S. Ct. 33, 37 L. E'd. 223; Reams v. 
Taylor, 31 Utah 288, 87 P. 1089, 120 Am. St. Rep. 
930; Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N. E. 
~96, 34 L. R. A. (N . .S.) 798, and annotation fol-
lowing.'' 
That case in turn was founded upon principles es-
tablished in the case ·Of Reams v. TaY'lor, 31 Utah 288, 87 
Pac. 1089. 
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As is so pointedly and decisively stated, in the case 
of landlord and tenant there is absolutely no duty of in-
spection after the tenancy commences on the part of the 
landlord. The reason for the rule is obvious. The ten-
ant has exclusive pos·session of the premises and has ex-
clusive operation of the facilities and appliances within 
the premises. The tenant has more intimate opportunity 
to dete:ct the presence of anything wrong in or about the 
premises than has the landlord, who, from the nature 
of the tenancy, is excluded from any right of entry what-
s-oever. 
It is no answer to this proposition that .some other 
or different relations,hip might have existed between 
these particular parties. Plaintiff alleged the relation-
ship and the trial court upon that allegation instructed 
the jury that t'he relationship of landlord and tenant 
existed between these parties. Also in instruction No. 
VII the trial court recognized the law as set forth in 
those ·decisions to which we hav·e referred. 
This law has been applied in several cases involving 
gas explosions where the relationship of landlord and 
tenant exists. 
In the case of Price v. MacThwaite Oil & Co., et al., 
(Okla. 193,6) 61 Pac. (2d) 177, an action was commenced 
by plaintiff against the gas company and landlord. Gas 
es-caping from an open pipe under the floor of the prem-
ises ·Caused an explosion and plaintiff was injured. Plain-
tiff alleged that as to the landlord it was the duty of the 
owner of the pr;operty to kee-p the same in safe condition. 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied liability 1n the 
following language: 
''As to defendant, Annie R. Carrell, plaintiff 
contends that there was error in sustaining the 
demurrer, and asserts, 'it is our contention t·hat 
the ·owner of premises must keep same in a safe 
condition f.or its tenants and other persons invited 
thereon. That it was the duty of said defendant 
to inspect the gas line .serving her property and 
see that there were no le·a'ks or uncapped pi pes 
eonnec.ted therewith at the time she let plaintiff 
thereon as her tenant.' '' 
* * * * * * 
''The generaJl rule to which no exception is 
called to our attention is: 'A landlord who, with-
out covenanting to repair, and without knowledge 
of latent defects, puts a tenant into full posses-
sion and control of demised premises, not intended 
for public purposes, and which are free from de-
fects ·Of construction constituting a nuisance, will 
not be liable for personal injuries sustained on the 
demised premises by reason of the defective con-
dition thereof, by the tenant, members of his fam-
ily, employees, guests of invitees, or others enter-
ing upon the premises under the tenant's title.' 
36 c. J. 204. 
''In Miller et ux. v. Vance Lumber Co., 167 
Wash. 348, 9 P. (2d) 351, 352, it is said: 'It is the 
settled rule of law in this state, prevailing gen-
erally in the United States and England, that: 
'' * * * In the absence of ex.press contract to 
the contrary, a tenant takes the demised premises 
as he finds them and there is no implied warrHnty 
'by the landlord that they are safe or fit for the 
purpose for which they are hired. The maxim 
caveat emptor applies." ' '' 
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Nelson v. Myers, (CaL) 270 Pac. 719. T•his was an 
apartment house case where asphyxiation was c1aimed 
to have been caused by defective automatic gas heater, 
used in the bathroom. There was, as here, conflicting 
evidence as to whether or not the landlord had had any 
notice at all of circumstances which might or could arouse 
suspicion. T·here, as here, the landlord had delivered 
possession of the property to the tenant. There, as here, 
the tenant failed to prove the cause of the injury, name-
ly, the souree of the gas causing the asphyxiation, to-wit, 
whether from a defective pipe ·or some other source and 
where, as in this case, they failed to .prove the source of 
the gas which .caused the explosion. The Court of Ap-
pea,ls of the T·hird District of California denied liability 
in the following language: 
''As a proximate cause ·of death, the ap-
pellants relied upon their theory that the ventilat-
ing pipe, which was intended to connect the gas 
heater with the aperture in the ceiling and thus 
convey the noxious gases into the outer air, had 
ibeen displaced so as to discharge the poison into 
the bathroom. T.he complaint alleged: 
"'That 'there existed ·On the water heater * 
* * a vent pipe * * * intended to collect 
said noxious gases * * * and convey the same 
into a flue, (eommuni.cating) with the outside air. 
* * * That said water heater and gas flame 
were in a bad state of repair and dangerous in 
thi·s, that the said vent pipe had become discon-
nected and * * * conveyed the said no!Xious and 
deadly gases so generated by said ga.s flame and 
discharged the same into .said ·bathroom.' 
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''The appellants utterly failed to prove the 
displacement of this vent pipe at the time of the 
accident. 'There is no evidence in the record that 
the vent pipe was found disconne:cted, or even that 
the gas heater was found lighted when the body 
of the deceased warS discovered. Upon the con-
trary, there is evidence that the transom over the 
bathroon1 door was found to be open a few inches, 
and there was no evidenc-e of the odor of gas in 
the room. The total failure to prove the proxi-
mate caus-e of death as alleged and relied upon 
by the appellants is fatal to their cause. In 20 
Standard Encyclopedia of Procedure, 322, it is 
said: '_,_~ variance between the allegations of the 
complaint, and the proof as to the proximate cause 
of the injury is fatal.' Certainly a substantial 
and material variance in that regard wiH defeat 
the recovery of a complainant. The jury may not 
1be permitted to spe~ulate as to the producing 
cause -of death. 19 Cal. Jr. 69'6, sec. 118; Puck-
ha.ber v. Southern P.ac. Co., 13'2 Cal. 363, 64 P. 480; 
Hopkins v. Heller, 59 Cal. App. 447, 210 P. 975. 
* * * * * * 
''The ~chief -contenti~on of the appellant in this 
case is t~hat the respondent, as the landlord of 
!Sunnyside Apartments, is liable for damages re-
sulting to a tenant from defects of a gas heater 
used as a part of the equipment of the rented 
premises, particularly since he assumed the re-
sponsibility of repairing such defects. It is doubt-
ful whether the respondent was required to clean 
or repair the gas heater unde~r the covenants of 
the lease which provided, 'The lessee agrees to 
make all minor repairs at his own expense' Clean-
ing the gas burner,s, replacing the screen, or ad-
justing the vent pipe appear to be 'minor repairs', 
which could be done with little labor, at small ex-
pense. When such minor repairs cost less than 
one month's rent of the premises, the lessee is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
authorize_Q. to make the repair,s and charges the 
expense .against his rent account. Civ. Code sec. 
19,42. "When the defects are trivial, and the cost 
of repairing them amounts to less than one 
month's rent ,of the premises, regardless of a land-
lord's covenant to repair, the only remedies which 
the lessee has for the landlord's failure to repair 
is to either vacate the premises or make the re-
pairs and charge the expense to the rent account 
pu~suant to seetion 1942, Civil Code. It is the 
settled law of this state that, in the absence of 
fraud or deceH on the part of the landlord in 
'concealing latent defects of which he has knowl-
edge, .and in the a1bsence of a direct covenant to 
make repairs, the le·ss,or is not liable to the tenant 
or others fo,r injuries resulting from defects in 
·the rented premises. 15 Cal. Jur. 704; 16 R. C. L. 
1059, se'c. 580; 1 Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, 
5!5·6, sees. 86, 87; Carty v. Blaut•h, 169 Gal. 713, 
716, 147 P. 949; Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 
57 P. 5'67; Daley v. Quick, 9'9 Gal. 179, 33 P. 859; 
De Motte v. Arkell, 77 Cal. App. 610, 621, 247 P. 
254; Hasse}l v. Denning, (Cal. App.) 258 P. 426; 
8melser v. Deutsche, etc., Kirche, ('Cal. App.) 263 
P. 838. A landlord is not an insurer ,of his demised 
premises against damages or injuries. He be-
·comes liable for injuries or damages only when 
his conduct amounts to fraud or deceit, such as a 
failure to distclose the existence of hidden defects 
of whic;h he has knowledge, and which m,ay not be 
discovered by the use of reasonable diligence on 
the part of the lessee. T'he doctrine of caveat 
emptor ordinarily app[ies to the leasing of prem-
ises. It is the· duty of the renter to exercise rea-
sonable ·Catre and diligence in inspecting the prem-
ises which he proposes to rent. Even when the 
landlord has covenanted to repair defects, or i~ 
guilty of constructive fraud in concealing hidden 
defetcts of which he has knowledge, the lessee may 
not recover damages when his own negligence 
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tained.'' 
Mansell v. Hoods, (Mass.) 126 N. E. 391. A radiator 
exploded by reason of some defective mechanical condi-
tion. The Massachusetts court stated the law with refer-
ence to the subject matter in the following lang,uage: 
''If there is a ·concealed defect that renders 
the premises dangerous which the tenant cannot 
discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
of which the landlord has .or ought to have knowl-
edge, it is the landlord's duty to disdose it, and 
he is lia1ble for an injury which results from his 
concealment of it.' Booth v. Merriam, 155 Mass. 
521, 5'22, 30 N. E. 85; Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 1\iass. 
471, 475, 18 N. E. 397, 1 L. R.. A. 429. But even 
if it is assumed that the jury would have been war-
ranted in finding that when the plaintiff examined 
the premises the ·Cheek valve was not pJainly 
visible, and could have been located only after in-
vestigation by a competent mechanician, she 
failed to offer any evidence which would justify 
a finding that the defendant knew, or ·had knowl-
edge of any circumstances from which such a 
result ·could be inferred, or that t·he hot water sys-
tem had been so defe.etively installed that its use 
might cause an explosion of the radiators. If the 
defendant did not know of any concealed defeet 
or conditions which might make the use of t·he 
premises dangerous, no liability has been shown, 
and the verdicts were ordered rightly.'' 
Widmar v. Healey, 159 N. E. 874. A stove expJoded 
and the tenant claimed that it was defective but finally 
relied upon the f.act that ice bad a0cumula ted in a pipe 
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leading from the .stove. L1iability was denied in the fol-
lowing language : 
'·'Even if the allegations of the complaint had 
been supported by evidence, no cause of action 
would have existed. No covenant to repair is al-
leged. Neither does the complaint state that de-
fen~_ant fraudulently concealed defects. In the 
absence of fraud or of a covenant, a lessor does 
not represent that the premises are tenantaJble and 
may be used for the purposes for which they are 
apparently intended.'' 
Morrow v. Otis, (Mass.) 146 N. E. 3-63. An action by 
tenant against landlord for injuries claimed to have been 
caused in permitting gas and heating appliances to be-
come defective and to be and remain out of repair, and 
in knowingly letting to the plaintiff a ro-om wherein the 
gas fixtures and appliances were defective. T·here, a.s 
here, inquiry was m·ade as to whether the appliances were 
safe and the tenant was assured that they were. The room 
was oecupied only three nights during which time there 
wa-s no trouble from escaping gas. The next night the 
tenant was taken si·ck by reason of es·caping gas. The 
Massa1chusetts Supreme Court denied liability in the fol-
lowing language : 
''The unexplained escape of gas from a fixture 
owned by the defendants is of itself no evidence 
of their negligence. Mur1lhY v. Boston Elevated 
Railway, 229 Mlas·s. 38, 118 N. E. 191. If there 
were a defect, its nature and the time when .it 
came into existence were mwtters of conjecture, 
and it did not appear that the most careful in-
spection on the part -of the defendants would have 
disdosed it. * * * 
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''The plaintiff ennnot recover on the ground 
that Mrs. Otis stated to her in substance that t·he 
gas fixture was all right, when she knew or should 
haYe known that it was defective. The evidence is 
not sufficient to prove that when the room was 
let the defendants knew, o:r in the exercise of rea-
sonable 0are should ·have known, that the fixture 
was defective or that any repairs were needed on 
it.'' 
\\T·hat, if any, evidence, therefore, was there of the 
existence of hidden, concealed or latent defects within the 
premises which were or should have been known to de-
fendant M·otor Park and which were or should not have 
been known to plaintiff~ Was any such hidden, concealed 
or Iratent defect, assuming one to have existed, the prox-
imate cause of the explosion~ 
Plaintiff's answer undoubtedly will be t'hat there i,s 
evidence in the reeO'rd t1o the effect that there had been 
odors of gas in the vicinity of the ;cottages in question 
prior to the time of the explosion and that the defendant 
wa·s informed of such fact. 
It is true that ·certain witnesses testified that there 
had been ·odors of g1as at diffe1rent points in the Motor 
Park. The defendant M·otor Park not only admitted that 
such had been the ca.se but the manager, Mr. Lindholm, 
testified th'at in the operation of a motor park or apart-
ment house where 113 ·Out .of the 125 cottages or apart-
ments are equipped with ga-s appliances, such oc;currences 
are not unusual. In many .of the cottages there were not 
only gas appHrances for heating but in addition a range 
or gas plate burner for cooking. He explained that in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
the operation of these appliances parts become worn 
through constant use by the tenants themselves. He also 
explained that the telllants will ·sometimes fail to entirely 
close a gas jet, by reason .of which a gas odor will result. 
Als~o, since most of these appliances are equipped with 
a pilot light it is not unusual for the pilot light to be-
come extinguished and that a ~as odor results. There 
are many other sour:ces of gas odors in the operation of 
such an establishment. He explained that in each and 
every instance the gas 'Company was called, an inspection 
made and repairs effected. 
But plaintiff wiH state there is evidence of Mrs. 
Bussell to the effect tha:t on January 2nd OT 3rd, 1938 
(prior to the time when plaintiff rented her apartment} 
there was a stl'long odor of gas in the garage or drive-
way separating the Bussell cottage from the Wheeler 
cottage immediately to the east of the Loos cottage, and 
M-rs. Bussell testified that she notified the office of the 
defendant Motor Park of the fact t·hiat there was a gas 
odor in the vicinity of that cottage. She also testified 
that again on January 17th (after M1rs. Loos was in pos-
session ·of her eottage) she observed that the odor of gas 
was particularly strong in the g;arage s·eparating the 
Bus·seH ·Cottage from the Wheeler cottage, and that stle 
again notified the office of the Motor Park of such fact. 
While this evidence was denied by Mr. Sheets, to whom 
she testified she made the report, we must assume for 
the purpose of this appe1al that her evidence was correct. 
While her direct evidence was to the effect that the Motor 
Park did nothing about it, she admitted upon cros.s-ex-
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aminaHon (Ab. 39) that a boy was sent to look a.t it and 
that she was not in the Wheeler cottage when the boy 
was there, and that she did not know ''rhat the officials 
of the Motor Park did about it. 
By the testimony of Mrs. Graham, housekeeper f·or 
the defendant Motor Park it was subsequently shown 
that the l1ast incident, to-wit, January 17th (Ab. 62-63) 
occurred by reason of the fact that the Wheeler's on a 
Sunday morning (Mrs. Bussell having established this 
incident as occurring ·on a Sunday morning) had placed 
a can of water ove1r the floor heater, which had be-come 
tipped over and extinguished the pilot light, causing an 
odor of gas, and that upon relighting of the pilot light 
the gas ·Odor disappeared. 
Mr. and Mrs. Loos occupied their cottage for over a 
week before the explosion. Neither one of them ever 
smelled any odor of gas in or about t·he same. During 
that time they operated both the gas heater and the 
range. Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler occupied the east portion 
of the cottage during that entire period .of time, and for 
many weeks prior to that. Their cottage was equipped 
with both a gas heater and a range. Mr. and Mrs. Loos 
and Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler used these appliances frequent-
ly. Plaintiff and her husband prepared their breakfast 
and dinner in the cottage. 
If, during this period of time, there had been any 
es·cape of gas either into the Loos cottage or into the aTea 
beneath it, the gas would have ignited from any one or 
more o.f these various operations of gas appliances. This 
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court will certainly take judicial notice .of the fa•ct that 
with two gas ranges and two gas heating appliances op-
erating in a cottage it would have been impossible for a 
gas leak to 'have been present in those cottages without the 
gas having become ignited. Also this court will take 
judicial notice of the fa,ct that if there had been any es-
cape of gas prior to the time ·of the explo.sion to the area 
beneath the Loos cottage it would have been manifest to 
Mr. and Mrs. Lo.os during the seven or eight days when 
they occupied the premises before the explosion. 
Was the fact that Mrs. Bussell might have smeHed 
the odor .of gas in the garage or driveway evidence of the 
fa:ct that there was a leak in the gas mains? Certainly 
not, any more than it was evidence of the fact that the 
Wheelers had failed to light their pilot light or the fact 
that the Wheeler·s ·or Loos had failed to entirely close 
their gas jets in the ·operation of their appliances. Is 
there any evidence of the f.act that the gas causing the 
odor which Mrs. Bussell smelled on or about January 
17th caused the explosion in question? If there was any 
such inference it certainly disappeared in presence of 
the positive evidence of Mrs. Graham to tihe -effect that 
it was caused by an extinguished pili01t light in the Wheel-
er cottage, and the fa:ct that gas .odors occurred from 
many different sou]}ces. It certainly was no evidence of 
the fact that there was a hidden, concealed structural 
defect of which defendant Motor Park had knowledge, 
such as to create liability under the cases heretofore 
submitted. 
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That there were or might have been gas odors is no 
evidence of the fart that the gas ca:me fro,m any parti-
cular source and would not relieve plaintiff of the re-
sponsibility of proving that the gas came from leaky or 
defective pipes as alleged in the eomplaint, and that the 
leaky or defe·ctive pipes were caused' ·by defe,ct as alleged 
in the complaint. 
Hernandez v. Southern California Gas Co., (CaL 
1931) 2 Pac. (2d) 360: 
"Assuming that the defendant was negligent in 
having some leaks in its pipes, no evidence was 
introduced sho-wing that any of t'hose leaks led 
to the sewer, and the uneontradicted evidence 
is that the escaping gas would rise and not fall, 
and that it could not fall below the water level 
down into the sewer which was lower than the 
top of the water. It thus appears that t'here was 
no evidence showing that '·the thing which caused 
the injury' W3JS under the management of the de-
fendant or that it belonged to the defendant, or 
that the defendant was in any way responsible for 
injuries caused by it. ' ' 
St. Marys 'Gas Company v. Brodbeck, 151 N. E. 323. 
We respectfully submit that ·the trial eourt erred in 
failing and refusing to grant the motion for non-suit 
and directed verdict. 
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POINT II. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO 
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
(Assignments of Error VIII and IX). 
In the absence of any direct evidence as to either 
the presence of a hidden or latent defect or of any knowl-
edge •On the part of defendant Motor Park with reference 
to it, defendant requested the trial court .to instruct the 
jury to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
had no applicability in determining the liability of the 
Motor Park in the case. These requests were known as 
Request No. 2 (Alb. 77) and 2-A (Alb. 77-78). Both of 
these requests weTe refused by the tri·al court so far a.s 
the defendant M.otor Park was concerned. The gas com-
pany made a similar request so far as it was concerned, 
which was granted and incorporated in the instructions 
to the court, being Instruction No. IX (.A'b. 92-93). The 
trial court did, however, give instruction No. V to the 
effect that before the jury would have the right to infer 
negligence on the part of defendant Motor Park from 
t·he mere happening .of the explosion, that the plaintiff 
must establish that the appliances within or beneath the 
premises involved in the explosion were under the ex-
clusive control of the defendant Motor Park. While this 
instruction No. V was not of itself err•oneous because 
it correctly state.s the law, it was not the instruction to 
which the defendant Motor Park was entitled under the 
law. They were entitled to the same positive, unequivocal 
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and direct instructi.on to the effect that under the evi-
dence and pleadings there wa.s no inference of negli-
gence at all, such as w.as given so far as the gas company 
was concerned. The positive evidence of every witness 
was to the effect that all the appliances within the de-
mised premises were under the ·Control of .the tenants, 
including MT. and Mrs. Loos and the Wheelers, and there 
was no ·conflict of evidence on the subject. Plaintiff's own 
complaint alleged that the gas was supplied and con-
trolled by the gas -company, and the only evidence upon 
the subject was that o.f Mr. Lindholm (Ab. 6·6) that the 
gas ·company controlled the supply of gas and the Motor 
Park had nothing to do with it, and it was the duty of 
the trial court under the pleadings and under the uncon-
tradicted evidence to instruct the jury positively and 
directly that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no ap-
pli·cability in the ease. By giving instruction No. V, per-
mitting the jury to speculate upon this issue, with refer-
ence to which there was no conflict, and by giving a posi-
tive instruction so far as the gas company was concerned, 
the effect was to leave the M.otor Park in an unfavorable 
position by permitting the jury to assume that there 
might be some doubt upon the subje.ct matter ·so far as 
the Motor Park was concerned. Particularly was this 
situation prejudicially damaging and erroneous when 
taken in connection with other instructions hereinafter 
referred to, wherein the court assumed to direct the jury 
not once but several times that there were leaky and de-
fective pipes, and that the gas causing the explosion came 
fr.om such source. 
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Under the uncon tradi·cted evidence and under the 
pleadings the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no ap-
plicability in this case, and we respectfully submit that 
under all of the authorities the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur never can have applicability where two parties 
are 0harged as being j.ointly responsible for the injury. 
The applicability of this doctrine has been considered 
by this court in several oase-s. 
Quinn v. Gas & Coke Company, 42 Utah 113. Plain-
tiff, a customer of the gas company, ·called at the office 
to pay her bill. 'There was ink on the counter which in-
jured her wearing apparel. There w.a.s no· evidence as 
to who placed the ink on the counter. Plaintiff recovered 
and this ·Court reversed the judgment, stating as follows: 
"'The doctrine is elementary that in cases 
where the maxim of res ipsa loquitur does not ap-
ply, negligence may not be presumed or inferred 
merely because an aJccident ·Occurred. In this case 
aU that is shown is that a bottle or well c.ontain-
ing ink, in some way unknown, was overturned, 
and that the ink was spilled, and some of it 
dripped upon respondent '·s dres.s and damaged it. 
At most, therefore, the case falls within the fam-
iliar doctrine that 'when a plaintiff pr.oduces evi-
dence that is consistent with an ~hypothesis that 
the defendant is not negligent, and also with one 
that he is, his proof tends to show neither.' 
(Ewing v. Goode, (C. C.) 78 Fed. 444.) Is it not 
just as reas~onable to infer that the ink was acci-
dentally ·spilled as to infer that it was negligently 
done~ * * * Under su1ch cir,cumstances a find-
ing of negligence can only be based upon conje.c-
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ture. Mere conjeiCture, however, cannot support 
a finding of negligence.'' 
KendaJl v. Fordhant, 79 Utah 256, 9 Pac. (2d) 183. 
This is an action for the negligent 'burning of a wheat 
field. Defendant park·ed his autom.obile on plaintiff's 
premises and immediately thereafter the autonwbile 
began to burn, .spreading to the wheat field. There was 
no evidenee as to how the fire started. The trial court 
submitted the case to the jury upon the doctrine of res 
ipsa l.oquitur, and this court reversed the case, stating as 
follows: 
"'There is no evidence in this case which tends 
to show what started the fire in defendant's auto-
mobile, and therefore the court was in error in 
permitting the jury to speculate as to its origin. 
The burden was on the plaintiffs to produce some 
proof that the fire in defendant's automobile was 
caused by the negligence of the defendant before 
they were entitled to have that question submitted 
to the jury. The law applicable to a state of facts 
such as is here presented is thus stated in 11 R. 
C. L. 955: 
" 'It is the well established generai rule that 
the destruction of property by fir·e, either upon 
the premises where it starts or is kindled, .or on 
·other property to which it is communicated, does 
not raise a presumption of negligence, either in 
the kindling or management of the fire, and that 
in all such cases the burden of pro.of is upon the 
plaintiff to show that the dam•age was caused by 
the negligence of the party kindling the fire or 
allowing the same to spread. Negligence or mis-
conduct, being the gist of the a•ction, must be 
proven. The circumstances under whieh a fire oc-
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~curs may, however, sometimes be such as to justi-
fy the application of the doctrine of res ispa 
loquitur, and impose upon the defendant the bur-
den of proving his freed.om from fault.' 
''No claim is here made, nor can the .claim he 
succes~sfully maintained, that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has any application to the facts dis-
closed by the evidence in this ease, nor can it be 
said that parking an automofbile ,on or near dry 
June grass adjoining a wheat field is an act of 
negligence.'' 
Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Company, 87 Utah 434, 49 
Pare. (2d) 9'58. This was an action for damage-s claimed to 
have been sustained by a customer from broken glass 
upon a display counter in the store. There was no evi-
dence as to how the glass got cracked or how long it had 
been ·cracked before the plaintiff was •cut by it. The trial 
court submitted the CJase to the jury upon the doctrine of 
res ipsa Loquitur. In reversing the judgment for plain-
tiff this court, in a unanimous opinion written by Mr. 
Jus'tice Wolfe, used the following language: 
''We cannot ·see how this case differs from 
the Quinn Case. In that case a bottle of ink had 
spilled, and plaintiff's dres~s was damaged by ink 
running upron it. In this case there was a cracked 
panel in the s'how case and the person of plaintiff 
was injured. In neither case did any one know 
how the ink was spiilled or the glass broken. In 
bo·th cases the cause of the .spilled ink or the 
broken glass may have been caUJSed by the ·cus-
tomer who was damaged or by another customer, 
·Or may hav·e been caused by some representative 
of tJhe company without negligence and unnoticed 
when it was done, or, in bot'h C~ases, it may have 
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been caused by the negligence of the company 
through a servant. The difficulty is that it is in 
the realm .of speculation, and under such Clircum-
.stances the d01ctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot 
apply. It applies where the thing from or by 
which the apparent negligence speaks is shown 
to be under t'he control or the management of the 
store and the accident is such, as, in the. ordinary 
•Course of things, does not or would not happen 
if those who had t'he management used the 
proper care. Where the way in which the accident 
happened warrantts a.n inference of negligence, 
then t'he mere happening speakJs for its·elf. Even 
then it is only evidence from which the jury may 
infer negligence. It is not negligence in law. See 
Williamson v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah 
84, 172 P. 680, L. R. A. 1918F, 588. If the cir-
cumstances are equally consistent with a cause 
which would not be attributable to negligence, 
then the doctrine does not 1apply. * * * In 
the instant cBJse it was just as ·consistent tha.t the 
plaintiff herself or some other customer had 
leaned against the showcase, wrenching the panels 
and thus splitting off a piece of gla·s,s, as if the 
defendant had done i1t negligently.'' 
It seems to us that the Kress case is upon all fours 
with the ·one at bar. No one testified in the case at bar as 
to how the explosion occurred, namely, :whether there was 
~some broken or defective pipes, ·O·r whether t'he gas which 
caused the explosion came fr·om an open gas jet f·or which 
some tenant was responsible, or whether it WBJS from some 
accidental rupture ·Of a pipe or connection at the parti-
cular moment, for which defendant would not be respon-
sible, or from some imperfeet or defective conneetion ow-
ing to faulty manufacture f.or which defendant Motor 
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Park certainly would not be responsible, or from some 
other 'source. As to this the record is a:bsolutely ,silent. The 
entire sulbject matter was left to the specu1ation of the 
jury exactly as in the eases which we have cited. 
Stanolind v. Bwnce, (Wyo. 1936) 62 Pac. (2d) 1297. 
Plaintiff wars injured by explosion of a gas heater in the 
baseme-nt of a dormitory. Plaintiff owned the gas heater 
but the employees operated it. Defendant also furnished 
the ga'S which exploded. The case was tried upon the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. An employee superintend-
ent of the gas plant was joined as a defendant with the 
ga,s comp:any. 
"It 1s averred by the plaintiff and denied by 
the defendants that the doctrine of res ipsa loqu-
itur, which was undertaken to be applied to the 
fa,cts herein, by the district court, through its in-
structions to the jury, was properly invoked. T'hat 
doctrine as stated by the Supreme Court of the 
U·nited St'ates in San Juan Light & T. Co. v. Re-
quena, 22·4 U. S. 89, 32 8. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L. Ed. 
680, is that, 'when a thing which causes injury, 
without fault of the injure'd person, is shown to 
be under the e~clusive control of the defendant, 
and the injury is such as, in t'he ordinary course 
of things, does not o:eoor if the one having such 
con'trol uses proper care, it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of an explanation, that the 
injury arose fr·om the defendant '.s want of care.' 
''Of simi1ar import are the essentials of the 
doctrine as well phrased by Dean Wigmore, 5 
Wigmore on Evidence ( 2d Ed.) 498, sec 2509, 
thus: 
'' '(1) The apparatus must be such that in 
the ordinary instance no injurious operation is 
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to be expected unless from a careless construc-
tion, inspe·ction, or user; (2) Both inspection and 
user must have been at the time of the injury in 
the .control of the party charge'd; (3) The injuri-
ous occurrence or oondition must have happened 
irrespective of any voluntary action at the time 
by the party injured.' '' 
* * * * * * 
"It is also to be observed that the doctrine 
will not be applied if there is any other re·ason-
a1>1e or probable •cause from whi~h it might be in-
ferred there \Yas no negligence at all; nor does 
it apply in any instance when the agen:cy causing 
the a·c~cidenf is not under the 1sole and exclusive 
·control of the per.s·on 'sought to be charged with 
the injury.'' 
* * * * * * 
"In t'he second place, we think that neither 
of these two instructions should have been given. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not in our 
judgment applicable to the facts of this case as 
disclosed by the record bef.ore us. Taking the 
three e~ssentials of the rule as l•aid down by Mr. 
Wigmore, and whi,ch ·we regard as both sound and 
salutary, and througili them s-crutinizing the facts 
·before us, we ·note that the healter in question, a 
standard equipment, w•as apparently one such that 
ordinarily no injurious operation was to be ex-
pected unless from a 'careless cons•truction, in-
spection, or user,' thus squaring with the first es-
sential aforesaid. 
''With the ·Sec•ond and third enumerated es-
sential-s, the facts of this recor'd do not conform. 
As to the second ·One, it is evident t'hat while the 
linspeetion ·o.f the heater was con trolled by the de-
fendant oompany, its user at the time of the injury 
was not. The plaintiff himself was using the 
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heater then. He had gone down to the basement 
to lig'ht the gas, as he had done, so he say1s, quite 
'a few tim.es before; he was an employee who had 
worked around gas for many years, and was un-
doubtedly familiar with its properties. He opened 
the door of the heater; he turned off the gas and 
returned shortly thereafter and attempted to turn 
it on again and light a.t, and the explosion hap-
pened. This was certainly use on his part o.f the 
device in que,stion at the time of the injury quite 
as obviously as wa·s a person's sitting down on a 
:chair, pushing a •swing door, or pressing an elec-
tric switch. Webster's N.ew International Dic-
tionary (2d.Ed.) defines the veJ.'fb 'use' as 'to make 
use of; to avail one's self of; to employ.' As to the 
heater, this the plaintiff undoubtedly did." 
In the most recent ca:se of Hohnema·nn v. Pacific 
Gas & Ele1ctric Compavny, decided Nov. 25, 1939, 96 Pac. 
(2d) 350, t'he District Court of Appeals of the First Dis-
trict of ·California -considered the applica:bility of the 
doctrine of res irps·a loquitur to a case of this kind. The 
injuries resulted from a gas e:x;plosion and the gas com-
pany obtained a drirected verdict upon the ground that 
if the ga·s passed the meter into the appliances of the 
consumer that the direction, management, control and 
regulation ·of the gas was in exclusive posses.sion ·of the 
o.wner of the building, and that under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur the ·only negligence .shown was that of the 
owner ·of the premises. It was an a:partment house and 
the particular apartment ci.n que·s'tion had been vacant f.or 
some time. Evidence wa1s presented from which an ~n­
ference 'might arise that the pipe wa1s uncapped at the 
time of the ex,plosion, but t'here was no direct evidence 
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as to exactly how the accident occurred or as to who ·was 
responsible for the condi'tion. It might have occurred in 
any one of several ways. There was no direct evidence 
upon the subject matter as in the case at bar. Contribu-
tory negligence was established, as before stated, by ap-
plication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur a·s against 
decedent. On the ot'her hand, the heirs ·of decedent claimed 
that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the gas com-
pany was lialble. Concluding that the trial court was in 
error in directing the verdict in favor of the ga·s company, 
the appellate Court ·considered the applicahility ·of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to :eases of this kind as fol-
lows: 
'''The rule ·o.f res ips·a loquitur, en1bodied in 
the phrase 'the thing speaks for itself,' has been 
held at times to include within its indefinite ·scope 
t'he modern use of vehicles, ma·chines, articles of 
different kinds and even livestock when the owne1·, 
operator or person in control, or party responsible 
for the maintenance or management of tihe in-
strumentality, is, by reason of his H·ccessibility, in 
a position to give an explanation of the oc:eurrence 
of the accident. On account of fast changing 
phases of modern life, no precise rule may be 
stated to cover this doctrine except to say that 
the injury must lbe such 'as would not have oe-
eurred eX'cept throu~h the negligent con'·struction 
or improper use of ~he instrumentality by the 
party having exdusive control thereof. 
''Regardless ·of its enlarged s-cope, we still 
fail to agree with defendant that the maxim ·orf 
res ipsa 'loquitur may he invoked b~T a defendant 
against a. plaintiff under the issues and facts of 
this ca·se. No authority upholding such theory 
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has been suggested. A plainmff ·c.alled upon under 
the maxim of res ipsa 1oquitur to explain the cause 
·of an injury, would he doing only that which is 
now required, namely, proving, by a preponder-
ance of t'he evidence, the ·affirmative allegations 
of the 0omplaint. 
''Conceding for the sake of discussion, but 
not deciding, that under certain facts not involved 
in this ·case the maxim of res ip·sa loquitur may be 
invoked by each ,side, the instrumentality causing 
the injury must be under the ex-clusive •control of 
the party agalinst whoin the rule is invoked. In 
this case the meter was exclusively owned and 
con'trolled by defendant ·0orporation; the pipe and 
;cap thereon exclusively •by the decedent. In other 
words, neither the decedent nor the defendant had 
control of both the ·swivel connection ·o.f the meter 
and the pipe and cap thereon in the apartment. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable 
unless the party agailllst whom the rule is inv·oked 
has not only accessibility to t'he facts of the case 
hut a beter opportunity, hased upon knowledge 
of surrounding fa,cts, ·of explaining tihe ·occurrence. 
:Scellars v. Universal Service, 68 .Cal. App. 252, 
228 P. 879. Under the facts of this case the rule 
wrus not applicaible to either side. The difference 
between the case of Chutuk v. Southern Calif.ornia 
Gas Co., supra, relied upon by respondent ·On this 
point, and the present one is "that in the Chutuk 
case the defendant gas company, irrespective of 
the location eit'her on or off ·o.f plaintiff·s' property, 
of the gas pipe and riser -causing the injury, re-
tained complete charge and ·control of such in-
'strument-ality. In this case the instrumentality 
was under the control ·O.f deeedent or defendant, 
but not of both.'' 
See also Gerdes v. Pacific Gas dl; Electric Co·., et al., 
(Cal. 1932) 13 Pac. ('2d) 393. 
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In Yiew of the fact that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur has no applicability to this case, and in view of 
the fact that the court erred in failing to so instruct the 
jury, we respectfully submit that not only did the trial 
court err in this regard but that through elimination of 
this doctrine the trial court erred in refusing to grant the 
motion for non suit and for directed verdict as prev-
iously argued, in that there was no evidence whatsoever 
of the specific acts of negligence alleged in the eom-
plaint. 
POINT III. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REPEATEDLY ASSUMING AND STAT-
ING TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE 
SYSTEM OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DE-
FECTIVE, LEAKING, AND THAT GAS WAS ESCAPING 
THEREFROM, AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSE'D THE 
EXPLOSION AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DE-
l!'ECTIVE OR LEAKING PIPES? (Assignments of Error III, 
IV, V and VI). 
The principal issues in this case so far as defendant 
Motor Park is concerned were as to whether the pipes 
and connections were defective and leaking, and as to 
whether defendant Motor Park knew of such fact. It 
therefore was incumbent upon plaintiff to establish the 
;source ·of the gas which caused the explosion, namely, 
whether it was from leaky or defective pipes, from 
valves left open by tenants, from sudden breaking of a 
pipe or connection, from some cause or reason, whether 
known or unknown to defendant, or from .some cause 
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wholly unknown. Of course in plaintiff's complaint she 
had alleged that the gas leak was due to the fact that 
the building had settled upon some pipe extending 
through a partition between the erust and west apart-
ments. It was therefore a very material question in 
the case and important that the jury first and foremost 
determine the ~s~ource of the gas which caused the explo-
.sion. If plaintiff was able to establish what she alleged 
in her complaint, namely, that there was faulty construc-
tion and that we knew or should have known of such 
fact, then a cause of action might be proved, but if, 
on the other hand, there was no evidence of such fact 
but the source ,of gas was unknown excepting by specula-
tion of the jury, then no cause .of action whatsoever 
was ·established as against the Motor Park. Therefore, 
as stated, the ·issue as to the 1source of the gas was an 
important and material one. In the giving of instruc-
tions No. 4, No. 10, No. 11 and No. 12 the court invaded 
the province of the jury by assuming t'hat the pipes and 
c-onnections were defective, and iby assuming that the 
gas which ·caused the explosion came fr·o.m that s·ource. 
Instruction No. 4 was as follows : 
''If you find from the evidence that the de-
fendant Mountain Fuel Company knew that the 
.system ,o.f pipes within the premises of the de-
fendant Park Company was defective, if you find 
they were, and that said pipes were leaking and 
gas was escaping therefrom, it then became the 
duty of the ·said Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
to either see that said pipes were placed in proper 
repair or to discontinue furnishing and delivering 
grus on said premises until .such repairs were 
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made. If, therefore, you further find from the 
evidence that arter said defendant Mountain 
Fuel :Supply Company had knowledge of such de-
fective pipes, and, having such knowledge, if it 
continued tQ convey and deliver gas through said 
system, and gas leaked therefrom and exploded 
on January 22, 1938, •causing injury to the plain-
tiff, she is ·entitled to judgment against said 
defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company for 
the injuries occasioned by such explosion.'' (A b. 
89-90). 
It will be observed that while at first the trial 
court ·submitted to the jury the question as to whether 
the system of pipes within the premi•ses of defendant 
Park Company was defective by inserting the phrase 
"if you find they were", it proceeded to state as a fact 
"and that said pipes were leaking and gas was escaping 
therefrom", and further proceeded to a1ssume that the 
pipes were •out ·Of repair and that repairs were neces-
'sary. And in the last part of the instruction again 
assumes that the pipes were defective, that gas leaked 
therefrom and exploded, and that the injury to plain-
tiff was caused by .such condition. Now here in that in-
struction ex:cepting in the first sentence is it left to the 
jury to determine any of those facts, but on the other 
hand the trialeourt assumed to state ·such to be the situa-
tion without question. 
Instruction No. 10 is as follows: 
''You are instructed that if you find from 
the evidence that the defendant Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company had no notice or knowledge that 
there was gas escaping in or under cabins 303 
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or 403 on the premises ,of the defendant Utah 
M·otor Park, Inc., prior to the time of the .explo-
:sion, then you are to return a verdict in favor 
of the defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
and ·against the plaintiff, no cause of action.'' 
(Ab. 93). 
It will be observed that the instruction assumes 
that gas was escaping in or under ·cabins 303 or 403 prior 
to the time of the explosion. With reference to this 
there was no evidence given by anyone. The most that 
could possibly be said is that Mr. and Mrs. Bussell 
teS'tified that there was an rodor of gas in the garage 
between the Wheeler and Bus,sell cottages. 
Instruction No. 11 reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that there was no· duty 
imposed upon the defendant Mountain Fuel Sup-
ply Company to exercise reasonable care to 
ascertain whether or not service pipes on the 
property of the defendant Uiah Motor Park were 
free fr,om leaks or defects of which the defendant 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company had no notice or 
knowledge." (Ab. 93). 
This instruction as·sumes that the service pipes 
on the property of the defendant Motor Park had leaks 
or defects. 
Instruction No. 12 reads as f.oHows : 
"You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the defendant Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company had no knowledge or notice 
.o,f a defect in the gas pipes or appliances under 
or in cabins 303 or 403 of the defendant Utah 
Motor Park, Inc., from which the gas escaped 
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which resulted in the explosion, then you are to 
return a verdic-t in favor .of the defendant Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company and against the plain-
tiff, no cause of Action." (Ab. 93-94). 
This instructi,on not only assume1s that there was a 
defect in the gas pipes or appliances under or in cabin 
303 or 403, but also assumes that gws escaped therefrom 
which resulted in the explosion . 
. With the trial court in four different instructions 
assuming such to be the case, there is little wonder that 
the jury adopted that view, notwithstanding the fact 
that it was the main issue in the case. It wou1d have 
been erroneous to incorporate such assumption into one 
instruction, but certainly by the oft repitition of it there 
is no doubt of the fact that this error was thoroughly 
prejudicial to the defendant Motor Park. 
This general proposition is well stated in Thompson 
on Trials, Second Edition, Vol. II, Section 2295, page 
1551, as follows : 
"It is error for the judge in instructing the 
jury: 1. To assume the existence of material 
facts which are in issue by the pleadings and 
which are controverted upon the evidence.'' 
There are authorities cited in that v~olume from 
many jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to support that proposition. 
This court in several authorities has recognized the 
same principle. 
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Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265. The court in that case 
in one of its instructi.ons stated that plaintiff was in a 
place where he had a right to be. One of the is,sues 
presented was as to his location. The court reversed 
the decision of the lower court upon that proposition in 
the fol1o,wing language: 
''One of the most strenuously contested 
points in the case was whether or not respond-
ent was standing in the position he claims to have 
been in when the collision occurred or stepped 
suddenly into the position where he was injured 
at the moment of the impact. Neither of the 
parties were trespasser.s. They were invitees, and 
they had an equal right to he on the premises. 
But as to which of them had the right, or the 
prior or superior right, to be in the particular 
'Spot where the injury occurred at the time of 
its occurrence, we think, in view of the conflict in 
the evidence, was a question which the jury 
should have been privileged to determine.'' 
In the case at bar the trial .court not only .stated 
that the pipes and connections were defective and that 
the gas causing the explosion came from that source 
which caused the injury in question, but repeated the 
.statement four times. 
State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497. One of the issue's 
in the case was as to whether the defendant Greene was 
married to the woman he was living with. The evidence 
upon the question was in conflict. The trial court in 
the presence of the jury, in denying a motion for directed 
verdict, inadvertently expressed an ·opinion upon the 
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subject matter. In ordering a new trial upon this ground 
this court used the following language: 
""\Ve know of no rule of law that permits a judge 
before whom a case is being tried to express his 
opinion in the presence .of the jury and in their 
hearing as to the weight of the evidence on a 
controverted question of fact. But, on the con-
trary, the authorities uniformly hold that for 
him to do so is error. * * * 
"\Vhile it is apparent from the record that 
the remarks complained of were purely inad-
vertent, and \vere not intended to influence the 
jury, yet this fact does not render them any 
less prejudicial to the defendant than if the 
judge had deliberately and intentionally made 
them for the express purpose of impre,ssing upon 
the jury his opinion respecting the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant.'' 
Of course in the case at bar the trial court deliber-
ately and intentionally stated these facts in f,o,rmal in-
structions, which made them all the more impressive, 
and then to be sure that they were impressive repeated 
it. 
Marti v. American Smelting d!; Refining Company, 
23 Utah 52. An instruction a·ssuming that plaintiff had 
been damaged was held to be erroneous and prejudicial 
in the following language : 
''By this instruction the court assumes that 
the plaintiff had proven his damages since the 
twenty-first day of June, 1899, and the jury were 
only limited in their inquiry as to the amount of 
such damages from that date. Under such in-
·structions the jury were left to a·ssess the dam-
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ages. It is true that in another part of the charge 
the jury were told that they were the judges 
of the facts and the credibility .of the witnesses, 
but we can not presume that the erroneous effect 
of the former was eliminated fr.om their minds 
by the latter instruction. 
''The questi,on passed upon by the court was 
a que,stion of fact for the jury to determine. The 
defendant must have been prejudiced by the 
instruction given.'' 
Hawley v. Corey, 9 Utah 175. The trial court in-
'structed the jury to the effect that a certain contract 
was made. Thereafter when the court's attention was 
called to the fact that there was a dispute upon that 
point, the court, by formal instruction, stated that he 
was wr,ong in so instructing, withdrew the instruction, 
and submitted the question to the jury as to whether or 
not a contract had actually been made. In reversing 
the case this court used the following language: 
''A perusal ·of it, we think, will convince any 
one that it was not a very clear and explicit 
declaration of the law governing the case. One 
of the most vigorously contested questions in the 
whole case, as appears by the evidence in the 
record, was the question whether or not any con-
tract whatever had ever been made between plain-
tiff and defendants. The court :first told the jury 
that this was a conceded fact. When they were 
·Called back into court he informed the jury that 
his instructions were wrong in one particular, 
perhaps two. First: 'I instructed y~ou it was 
·conceded that the contract f.or this work was 
made. Counsel say that is not true.' Thereupon 
the court gave an instruction upon this question. 
The average jury, from the whole of this in-
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struction, would unquesti~onably get the impres-
sion that the oourt eonsidered it a settled ques-
tion fron1 the proof that the contraet was made 
as daimed by the plaintiff, but that out of defer-
ence to the denial of counsel it was formally sub-
mitted to them to be passed upon. It is true 
that counsel in their exception called the attention 
of th~ court to the fact that the defendants denied 
the contract both in their pleadings and in the 
testimony in the most positive terms, and this 
denial did not rest, as ·stated by the court, with 
the counsel, but with the parties and witnesses in 
the action. The question should . have been .sub-
mitted to the jury, without any expression of 
opinion fron1 the court, for them to find whether 
or not a contract had been made.'' 
There are numerous authorities f~om other juris-
dictions upon the subject. \V e call the court's .attention 
to a few of them without quotation because to do so 
would unduly lengthen this brief. We assume this oourt 
will read the fol1o·wing authorities: 
Montgomery Ward & Oompa;ny v. Arbogast, 
(Wyo. 1938) 81 Pac. (2d) 885; 
Carpenter v. Oonnecti'cut General Life Ins. 
Co., (C. C. A.lO, 1933) 68 Fed. (2d) 69; 
Jessup v. Davis, (Neb.) 211 N. W. 190. 
Mcl(eon v. Lissner, (Cal.) 223 Pae. 965. This case 
is peculiarly in point as it involves an .accident alleged 
to have occurred through failure to k~ep appliance~s in 
repair. 
Cheney v. Buck, 189 Pac. 81; 56 Utah 29. The 
trial ·court refused to give an instrucHon in that case 
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which assumed a fact in issue. In sustaining the action 
of the trial court, this eourt used the following language: 
''By this instruction the court was requested 
to assume and tell the jury as a matter of fact 
that respondent was on the wrong side of the 
roadway. The court was asked to tell the jury 
it was respondent's duty to 'pass ar·ound the in-
tersection of the main public highway and Gentile 
Street.' Thi,s instruction, with others requested 
by appellant, would have invaded the province of 
the jury and would have taken from the jury 
issues that were for them, and not for the .court, 
to decide. The requests were properly refused, 
and it would have been error to have given them 
or either of them.'' 
Kellems v. Schiele, 
(Ill. 1938) 17 N. E. (2d) 604. 
POINT IV. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE 
SAME DEGREE OF RES:PONSI:BILITY AS THE GAS COM-
PANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAlS? (As.signment of Error II). 
The court gave instruction No. 2 as follows: 
" 'Ordinary care' I have defined for you in 
a separate instruction. Y.ou are instructed fur-
ther that the degree of care which one conveying 
gas or ,o,ther dangerous commodities is required 
to use increases in pr.oportion to the increased 
danger of the commodity. The defendants, there-
fore, in supplying gas· to the premises occupied 
by the plaintiff at and immediately before the 
time of the explosion, were chargeable with that 
degree of ·Care .to prevent damage to the plaintiff 
which was commensurate to the danger which it 
was their duty to guard against and avoid.'' 
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To this instruction defendant Motor Park took ex-
ception. (Ab. 97-98). 
It will be observed that in defining ·ordinary care 
so far as both defendants are eoncerned, the instruction 
assumes that the defendant M,otor Park was engaged in 
the business of supplying gas to the premises occupied 
by plaintiff, and that the defendant Motor Park along 
with the gas company was ,charged with a high degree 
of care in the .supplying of gas to prevent damage to 
the plaintiff. 
In ~other words, by this instruction the Motor Park 
as a customer of the gas company and as the owner 
of the premises was placed in the same position as the 
gas company, the seller of the gas which was engaged in 
the business of ,supplying gas. We respectfully submit 
that this was erroneous and does not correctly state 
the law with reference to ordinary care so far as a 
landlord is concerned. 
Under all of the authorities '',ordinary care'' so 
far as a landlord is concerned, consists of permitting 
the tenant to make inspection of the premises and of 
disclosing to the tenant the existence rOrf all hidden or 
latent defects ·Of which the landlord has knowledge. 
Since when does the ownership of a building, 
whether apartment house, store or private residence, 
constitute being engaged in the business of supplying 
gas and ,selling it to people who may be lawfully within 
the premises 1 
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The authorities are replete with cases holding pub-
lic utilities engaged in the busines·s of selling gas and 
other commodities to the public to a very high degree 
of .care, not only in .seeing that the facilities are safe 
but in seeing that the gas is shut off when the facilities 
are unsafe, even though they may be upon the premises 
of the customer. We know of no -authorities, however, 
which hold that the customer or consumer, by having gas 
installed upon his premises, becomes a public utility 
and .seller of those commodities. You might just as 
well state that the owner of an apartment house, store, 
building or home, by reason of the fact that the premises 
are equipped with lighting facilities, is engaged in the 
business of selling electric power. The shoe is entirely 
on the other foot. The Utah Motor Park in this case was 
a customer or consumer, one step removed from Mr. and 
Mrs. Loos, because they had absolutely no ·control over 
either the .appliances, pipes within the building, or the 
flow of gas into the premises. 
In the giving of this instruction the trial court not 
,only departed from the law but disregarded the evidence 
and departed from the issues presented by the plead-
ings. 
As heretofore ~stated, the complaint expressly alleged 
that the gas company was engaged in the business of 
·supplying gas to the premises. Nowhere in the com-
plaint is' there any allegation to the effect that the Motor 
Park had anything to do with the gas excepting as owner 
of the premises. N1owhere in the evidence is there one 
word with reference to the ownership of the gas within 
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the cottage. The record is absolutely silent as to whether 
the plaintiff was paying for the gas or whether the Utah 
Motor Park was paying for the gas. There is no evi-
dence as to whether the gas was included within the 
rental charge for the cottage or whether it was some-
thing in addition. Assuming, however, that the rental 
charge included the gas it ·still did not put the Motor 
Park in the position of a public utility dealing with gas 
which, as .stated, is a dangerous commodity handled 
only by experts lawfully authorized to engage in that 
business, and who under the law are held to a high degree 
of responsibility. 
We have hereto£ore cited cases from this court and 
·others as to what the responsibility ·of a landlord is 
toward his tenant. Niowhere is there any authority to 
the effect that a landlord through the rental of hi's 
premises changes like a chameleon fr,om a landlord to a 
gas company. 
This instruction is not only erroneous but doubly so 
and highly prejudicial in view of the failure of the court 
to instruct the jury correctly as to what the law requires 
of a landlord in fulfilling his duty to a tenant, as here-
inafter argued. 
POLNT V. 
DID TH~ COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE MOTOR PARK AS LANDLORD IS NOT LIABLE 
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF LATENT OR HIDDEN DEFECTS 
OR UNKNOWN OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS UPON THE 
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PREMISES, AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF WARRANTY 
THE PLAINTIFF TOOK THE PROPERTY AND RENTED THE 
CABIN SUBJECT TO ALL, HIDDEN OR LATENT DEFECTS 
OF WHICH THE MOTOR PARK HAD NO KNOWLEDGE, AND 
THAT IF THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED BY THE UNEXPECT-
ED BREAKING OR GIVING WAY OF SOME JOINT, PIPE, 
OR CONNECTION NO LIABILITY WOULD EXIST ON THE 
PART OF THE MOTOR PARK? (.A!ssignments of Error X, XI, 
XII and XIII). 
It was incumbent upon the trial court to instruct 
the jury as to the law in the State of Utah with refer-
ence to the degree of care which a landlord owes to his 
tenant. It was likewise incumbent upon the court to 
outline in his instructions to the jury the legal sufficiency 
of the alleged acts of negligence as constituting a cause 
of action, and the legal rights and liabilities existing 
between plaintiff and the defendant Motor Park in view 
of the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
Defendant Motor Park requested instructions upon 
thi·s subject matter. They are known as requested in-
structions No. 4 (Ab. 78), No. 7 (Ah. 79-80), No. 8 
(Ab. 80) and No. 9 (Ab. 80-81). Each and all of these 
instructions were based upon the law ~announced by this 
court in the cases cited under Point I. 
The only place where the court came anywhere near 
instructing upon this material and important proposi-
ti.on of law was in instruction No. 2 (Ab. 89) wherein it 
erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant Motor 
Park along with the gas company was held to the 
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highest degree ·of care in the selling of gas, notwith-
standing the fact that the co1nplaint alleged the gas was 
sold by the gas company and not by the Motor Park, 
and in instruction No·. 7 wherein it stated that in the 
event the explosion occurred by reason of the existence 
of a defect in the joint or connections they must find 
that the defendant :Motor Park knew or had reasonable 
ground to believe ·o.f the existence of the defect. This 
last instruction, while correct in and of itself, was limited 
in effect in that it was effectual only in the event the 
jury should find that the explosion occurred by reason 
of the existence of a defect. This did not satisfy the 
legal duty of the trial court to instruct the jury that the 
defendant :M~otor Park as landlord was liable under the 
pleadings and evidence in the case only in the event 
the explosion occurred by reason of the existence of 
defects in the pipes or appliances of which it had knowl-
edge. The requested instructions had for their purpose 
and effect the narrowing of the issue so far as the 
defendant jJoto·r Park is concerned, and the definite 
and express instruction by the court as to the respons-
ibility which a landlord owes to a tenant. 
By refusing to give these instructions the court 
threw it wide open to the jury to find against defendant 
Motor Park upon any theory set forth in the complaint, 
notwithstanding the fact that as to one of those alleged 
acts of negligence, to-wit, failure to inspect, this court 
in the Hatsis case definitely stated there is absolutely 
no such duty upon the part of the landlord. 
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We submit these assignments ,of error and this 
point upon authority of the cases cited in this brief under 
Point I. 
POINT VI. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO TAKE FROM THE JURY 
CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THE MOTOR PARK WITH 
REFERENCE TO WHICH THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE? 
(Assignment of Error XIV). 
In its requested instruction No. 10 (Ab. 81-82) de-
fendant requested elimination from consideration of the 
jury of two alleged grounds of negligence, namely, those 
relating to the settling of the building upon pipes project-
ing through the partition, by reason of which the pipes 
and connections were cracked and broken, and the other 
alleged ground of negligence relating to the ventilators. 
As heretofore argued and .submitted to the court, there 
was absolutely no evidence upon either of those subjects 
excepting as to, the ventilators, with reference to which 
the only eJVidence was in favor of the defendant to the 
effect that there were ventilators in the foundation and 
that they were open. 
It was error upon the part of the trial court to .sub-
mit those issues to the jury when there was absolutely 
no evidence upon one subject and uncontradicted evi-
dence in favor of defendant upon the other. The effect 
was to permit the jury to speculate upon matters about 
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which there was no evidence or no dispute. It was a law 
question for the court, not a question of fact £or the jury. 
Eklwnd v. lJtlet. Life Ins. Co., 89 Utah 273. 
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 
366, in reversing the case for improper instructions, 
this court used the following language: 
"Thus the charge falls within the familiar rule 
that it is error to give instructi·ons based on 
a state of facts which there is no evidence tend-
ing to prove, or which the undisputed evidence 
in the case shows did not exist, even though such 
instructions contain correct statement·s of law.'' 
See 64 C. J. 312: 
"Evidence which merely makes it possible for 
the facts in issue to be as alleged, or whir~h raises 
a mere conjecture, .surmise, or suspicion, presents 
no question of fact for submission to fhe jury, 
and should not be left to the jury, it being err·or 
to do so, the rule being that, to justify submis,sion 
to the jury, the proof must be sufficient to raise 
more than a mere conjecture ·Or surmise that the 
fact is as alleged. * * * However, where 
there is no evidence to support ·an issue, it should 
not be submitted to the jury, and it is erroneous 
to do s·o, s·o that a refusal of the .court to ,sulbmit 
the issue is proper, and such issue may properly 
·be withdrawn from the jury." 
64C.J.318: 
"Where the evidence is not sufficient to justify 
a submission to the jury, or to support a verdict, 
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the case should not be submitted, and the court 
may properly refuse to do s·o; submi,ssion in such 
instanee being erroneous. So, also, where plain-
tiff .f·aHs to produee evidenee on an essential ele-
ment ·o.f his case, and no reasonable inference can 
be drawn from a fact .supported by evidence tend-
ing to prove .sueh element, it its error for the court 
to submit the case to the jury." 
We respectfully submit that on account of each and 
all of the error•s presented herein that the trial court 
erred in denying the motion for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BADGER, RICH & RIOH, 
and W. H. FOLLAND, 
Attorneys for Defen.darnt atnd 
Appellant Uta:h Motor Park, Inc. 
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